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locks; strict;
comment	@ * @;


1.2
date	2026.06.13.10.02.33;	author markd;	state dead;
branches;
next	1.1;
commitid	RRbPskgJPdukBCJG;

1.1
date	2023.11.12.16.50.10;	author rillig;	state Exp;
branches;
next	;
commitid	qr5p0Ajw00a8elME;


desc
@@


1.2
log
@cjose: update to 0.6.2.6

0.6.2.6
* **Security fix**: AES-CBC-HMAC JWE encryption used an all-zero content-encryption key.
  `_cjose_jwe_set_cek_aes_cbc` inverted the "random" flag and zero-filled the CEK instead
  of generating it from `RAND_bytes`. Every JWE produced with an AES-CBC-HMAC `enc`
  (A128CBC-HS256 / A192CBC-HS384 / A256CBC-HS512) combined with a non-`dir` key-management
  `alg` (A128/192/256KW, RSA-OAEP, RSA1_5) was encrypted and authenticated under an
  all-zero key, breaking confidentiality and integrity for those ciphertexts. The `dir`
  algorithm and all AES-GCM `enc` values were not affected. Adds a regression test.
* Additional hardening from a security audit of `jwe.c` / `jwk.c` / `jws.c`:
  * Fix EVP_CIPHER_CTX leak in AES-CBC content encryption on authentication-tag failure
  * Avoid NULL dereference of the optional `cjose_err` in ECDH-ES key decryption
  * Use a constant-time comparison for the multi-recipient CEK consistency check
  * Cleanse private key material (RSA/EC/oct) on JWK import and export, and fix a leak of
    the base64url buffer in EC private-key export
  * Check the ephemeral-key allocation in ECDH key derivation
  * Use integer arithmetic (instead of floating-point) for the base64url length check on
    imported JWK fields
  * Harden JWS EC signature reconstruction against allocation failures (NULL checks on
    ECDSA_SIG_new and BN_new)
  * Enforce the RFC 7518 minimum HMAC key length (key >= hash size) for JWS sign/verify

0.6.2.5
* Fix heap buffer overflow in AES key unwrap by validating the encrypted_key length before
  AES_unwrap_key
* Fix functions that rely on nonportable malloc behaviour
* Merge fixes from cisco/cjose
  * Check ECDH secret allocation result
  * Check base64 decode length bounds
  * Guard JWK retain count overflow
  * Enforce JOSE IV lengths
  * Check JOSE algorithms against key types
  * Validate critical JOSE headers
  * Cleanse sensitive buffers before release
  * Guard JWE buffer length calculations
  * Use OpenSSL constant-time comparisons
  * Validate EC inputs before key agreement
  * Fix JWS import allocation handling

0.6.2.4
* fix memory leak in ECDH-ES JWE encryption/decryption
* fix rsa_q = NULL initialization in _RSA_private_fields
* fix memory allocation check (typo) in jwk.c
* fix gcc10 errors for -Werror=ignored-qualifiers and remove unused includes
* re-generate automake/autoconf files with automake v1.17 and libtool v2.5.4

0.6.2.3
* disable RSA PKCS 1.5 by default
* avoid using empty prototypes; support Clang 15 and XCode 14.3
* build shared library on Cygwin by adding -no-undefined to LDFLAGS
@
text
@$NetBSD: patch-concatkdf.c,v 1.1 2023/11/12 16:50:10 rillig Exp $

Fix build on NetBSD.

--- src/concatkdf.c.orig	2023-08-22 12:18:03.202602223 +0200
+++ src/concatkdf.c	2023-08-22 12:17:49.008381386 +0200
@@@@ -12,8 +12,12 @@@@
 #include <malloc.h>
 #else
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
+#ifdef __NetBSD__
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#else
 #include <alloca.h>
 #endif
+#endif
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <cjose/base64.h>
@


1.1
log
@textproc/cjose: fix CVS keyword expansion in patch file
@
text
@d1 1
a1 1
$NetBSD$
@