head 1.3; access; symbols; locks; strict; comment @# @; 1.3 date 2026.11.18.13.45.40; author he; state Exp; branches; next 1.2; commitid YVA4XguDSmTIMW3H; 1.2 date 2026.10.21.13.39.17; author taca; state Exp; branches; next 1.1; commitid pXjHHLz9tiYjEl0H; 1.1 date 2026.10.10.10.13.08; author he; state Exp; branches; next ; commitid OycRLBEA4xhsRUYG; desc @@ 1.3 log @net/bind920: Upgrade to version 9.20.31. Pkgsrc updates: * Version & checksums Upstream changes: Notes for BIND 9.20.31 ---------------------- Removed Features ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - Deprecate NXDOMAIN redirection. The :any:`nxdomain-redirect` option and :any:`type redirect` zones are now deprecated. A warning is logged when they are encountered in :iscman:`named.conf`. :gl:`#6451` - Deprecate NSEC3 salt. BCP 236 (:rfc:`9276`) recommends using neither extra NSEC3 iterations nor salt. Extra iterations have been disallowed for some time; a warning is now also logged when :any:`nsec3param` in a :any:`dnssec-policy` sets a non-zero ``salt-length``. :gl:`!13036` Feature Changes ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - Minimize ANY responses over TCP when :any:`minimal-any` is enabled. When :any:`minimal-any` was enabled, :iscman:`named` minimized ANY responses over UDP but returned all available RRsets over TCP. It now returns a single RRset, with its covering RRSIGs when requested, and omits unnecessary authority and additional data regardless of transport. :gl:`!13056` - Keep accepting CN-only certificates in :option:`dig +https` with OpenSSL 4.1. When verifying the hostname of a DNS-over-HTTPS server, :option:`dig +https` accepts a certificate whose only name is in the Subject Common Name. OpenSSL 4.1 no longer consults the Common Name, so when BIND 9 was built against it, such certificates were rejected with a peer verification failure. :option:`dig +https` now asks OpenSSL 4.1 and newer to check the Common Name explicitly, so these certificates are accepted as with earlier OpenSSL versions. With OpenSSL 4.1 and newer, the Common Name is now also consulted for certificates that contain a SubjectAltName. :gl:`!12944` Bug Fixes ~~~~~~~~~ - Prevent the server from stalling when reopening or rolling the :any:`dnstap` output. Previously, reopening or rolling the :any:`dnstap-output` file, either with :option:`rndc dnstap` or automatically at its size limit, stopped all of :iscman:`named`'s processing until whatever was already running, such as an RPZ zone update, had finished and the old output had been replaced. The output is now switched over while the server keeps running; the few :any:`dnstap` messages produced during the switch itself are dropped and counted in the :any:`dnstap` statistics. Logging to a size-limited output also no longer checks the file on disk for every message. :gl:`#6461` - Prevent automatic interface scanning from stopping after a burst of address changes. When many addresses were removed and added again in quick succession, as happens with ``netplan apply``, the kernel could drop some of the resulting interface change notifications. :iscman:`named` then gave up on automatic interface scanning, logging ``automatic interface scanning terminated: not enough free resources``, and stopped listening on some addresses until it was restarted. Lost notifications now trigger a fresh scan of the interfaces once the burst is over. :iscman:`named` also asks the kernel to report only address changes and to queue more of them, so that notifications are lost less often. :gl:`#6389` - Try the next primary server instead of aborting the zone transfer. If a misconfigured primary server returned, for example, a zone with too many records or a zone that failed verification, the secondary server could abort the zone transfer altogether instead of trying the next configured primary. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6352` - Fix Offline KSK signing when the KSK and a ZSK share a key tag. With :any:`offline-ksk` in :any:`dnssec-policy`, the KSK and the ZSKs are generated separately, so a ZSK can have the same key tag as the KSK. :iscman:`named` then mistook the ZSK for the KSK when signing the zone; this meant the DNSKEY RRset was left without the KSK signature from the imported SKR, or, depending on the signing algorithm, the import of the SKR failed with a ``not exact`` error. This has been fixed. :gl:`#5540` - Sign NOTIFY messages retried over TCP with the configured TSIG key. When a NOTIFY message to an :any:`also-notify` target with an explicit TSIG key failed over UDP and was retried over TCP, the key was lost. The retry then used the key from a matching :namedconf:ref:`server` statement or, if there was none, was sent unsigned. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6240` - Answer DS queries for CNAME names from the cache. Previously, a resolver answering a DS query for a name that was a CNAME (for example, ``www.example.com`` pointing to ``example.com``) ignored the CNAME it had already cached and sent the query upstream every time, so such answers were never served from the cache. The cached CNAME is now used for DS queries as it is for any other type, while a DS record or a negative DS answer cached at the same name still takes precedence. :gl:`#6455` - Omit unvalidated data from type-ANY cache responses. When answering a type-ANY query from the cache, :iscman:`named` could include data that had not yet been validated. Such data is now only included in the response if the query has the CD bit set. :gl:`#5984` - Fix slow :iscman:`rndc` responses under a high request rate. The :iscman:`rndc` command could run slowly if a large number of requests was made over a short period of time. This has been fixed. :gl:`#3698` - Prevent :iscman:`rndc` from accepting stale or mismatched signed responses. The :iscman:`rndc` command could accept reflected requests as answers, as well as replayed responses. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6101` - Make :option:`rndc -r` work when :iscman:`rndc` and :iscman:`named` are from different builds. Previously, :option:`rndc -r` was only guaranteed to display the correct result code when :iscman:`rndc` and :iscman:`named` were from the same build. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6102` @ text @$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.2 2026/10/21 13:39:17 taca Exp $ BLAKE2s (bind-9.20.31.tar.xz) = bcece5e8a141071d0eccc3cbe537da34373beb1c6118bb2c4095c72985b3addc SHA512 (bind-9.20.31.tar.xz) = 8f2f8b635da33b79f94dda5ae374402718e5edcbbdd7a0cfbd1ff04102073e0cf6d993379d66707e990b954de3d75512869bab8bd003e47f2267ffd45f7bab4b Size (bind-9.20.31.tar.xz) = 6019280 bytes SHA1 (patch-configure.ac) = d3b9bb82c8e164135b93a76d5c53ad40521226e2 @ 1.2 log @net/bind920: update to 9.20.30 pkgsrc chnage: correct path in buildlink3.mk. BIND 9.20.30 (2026-10-21) This maintenance releases contains these security fixes: https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2026-19630 https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2026-94300 https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2026-96888 https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2026-97313 For full changes, please refer: https://bind9.readthedocs.io/en/stable/notes.html#notes-for-bind-9-20-30 @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.1 2026/10/10 10:13:08 he Exp $ d3 3 a5 3 BLAKE2s (bind-9.20.30.tar.xz) = a517b9e4955221242b1a36694076d03323bb624922106c5cfad1344aa600a6bf SHA512 (bind-9.20.30.tar.xz) = 3717897d35311e2056f0c0cb7d97c32348b4e2202762f3b98dd0e405f78fa2281e5f7f07341df67e58c303f1c7acb81e707dd727db7b2e5592f1af549eae3325 Size (bind-9.20.30.tar.xz) = 6004232 bytes @ 1.1 log @net/bind920: Add a package for BIND 9.20.x, version 9.20.29. This is brought over from pkgsrc-wip, despite it still lacks the blocklist patches. This is the upstream release note for this latest version: Notes for BIND 9.20.29 ---------------------- Security Fixes ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - Prevent excessive CPU use validating crafted DNSSEC responses. :cve:`2026-19668` A malicious authoritative server could serve a securely delegated zone whose DS and DNSKEY records carried many distinct key tags but no valid match, forcing a validating resolver into excessive key-tag matching and high CPU use for every query. This work is now bounded by the per-query validation limit (:any:`max-validations-per-fetch`). ISC would like to thank Zuyao Xu and Xiang Li of the All-in-One Security and Privacy Laboratory, Nankai University, for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#5349` - Require a TSIG on every message of incoming zone transfers. :cve:`2026-19033` Previously, :iscman:`named` accepted TSIG-signed zone transfers in which some messages were unsigned, and processed those messages before the next signature could vouch for them. It now requires a TSIG on every message of an incoming AXFR or IXFR; all modern nameservers already sign every message, so no change is expected in practice. :gl:`#6062` - Prevent a DNSSEC downgrade of secure delegations via unrelated NSEC3 records. :cve:`2026-77119` A validating resolver could be tricked into treating a secure delegation as unsigned and accepting forged answers for names beneath it, if an attacker could inject responses to its queries. Such forged proofs are now rejected. :gl:`#6234` - Prevent forged DNSSEC-validated NXDOMAIN responses. :cve:`2026-19941` A validating resolver could accept a signed NSEC record from an unrelated zone as proof that a wildcard did not exist. An on-path attacker or malicious forwarder controlling a signed zone could therefore forge an authenticated NXDOMAIN response for a name that should resolve through a wildcard. The wildcard-denial and name-nonexistence proofs are now required to be signed by the same zone. :gl:`#6253` - DNS64 with :any:`break-dnssec` could cause an assertion failure. :cve:`2026-19666` When a :any:`dns64` statement is configured with ``break-dnssec yes;`` and its ``exclude`` list matches some but not all of the addresses in an AAAA RRset, :iscman:`named` removes the excluded addresses from the answer instead of synthesizing new ones. If the answer being filtered had been cached together with a proof that the queried name did not exist â<80><94> which is what a wildcard match produces â<80><94> :iscman:`named` terminated with an assertion failure. Only recursive resolvers are affected, and only when ``break-dnssec yes;`` is in use; the answer has to come from the cache, so a server that is only authoritative cannot reach this. ISC would like to thank Rintaro Kawasugi for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6301` - Reject oversized negative cache records. :cve:`2026-19667` A single crafted response from a server could make a resolver cache a malformed negative entry and then terminate with an assertion failure when reading it back. Only recursive resolvers are affected, on a default configuration. ISC would like to thank Rintaro Kawasugi for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6302` - Prevent resolver crash with cached DNSSEC proofs. :cve:`2026-19662` Under certain timing conditions, concurrent recursive queries could cause :iscman:`named` to crash when cached DNSSEC NOQNAME proof data was replaced while still in use. Cached proof data is now retained until all queries using it have completed. ISC would like to thank Samy Medjahed/Ap4sh for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6333` - Discard repeated SOA, CNAME, and DNAME records when parsing DNS messages. :cve:`2026-75029` A DNS message could carry the same SOA, CNAME, or DNAME record many times, and :iscman:`named` kept every copy while parsing it. With name compression those copies took up far more memory internally than in the message itself, and every later processing step had to handle all of them. Only the first copy of such a record is now kept; identical repeats are discarded. :gl:`#6335` - Fix an unauthenticated crash on HTTPS using SIG(0). :cve:`2026-77692` A specifically crafted HTTPS query using SIG(0) as authentication could crash :iscman:`named` if the client closed the connection before :iscman:`named` actually verified the signature. This is now fixed. ISC would like to thank Vitaly Simonovich for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6343` - Cached HTTPS/SVCB aliases could exhaust resolver CPU. :cve:`2026-81736` A recursive resolver that had cached a large set of interlinked HTTPS or SVCB records in alias form could be driven to do an excessive amount of work assembling a single response, because it followed every cached alias target when building the additional section. A client permitted to use recursion, together with an attacker-controlled zone used to plant the records, could repeat small queries to consume enough CPU to delay or deny service to other clients. The amount of additional processing done for one query is now bounded. ISC would like to thank Henrique Pereira for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6347` - Prevent TKEY queries from terminating :iscman:`named` without global options. :cve:`2026-76163` The :iscman:`named` process could terminate unexpectedly when a remote client sent a TKEY query and the configuration did not include a global :namedconf:ref:`options` statement. This has been fixed. ISC would like to thank Owais Lone (thesecguy) for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6357` - Out-of-zone records in a zone database could be served as authoritative. :cve:`2026-78301` When a zone database contained records for names outside the zone â<80> <94> such as a delegation above the zone apex, left behind by a secondary that had accepted out-of-zone data from its primary â<80><94> the server could treat them as authoritative and answer queries for names inside the zone with that out-of-zone data instead of the zone's own. A server that was also a resolver could follow such a delegation and cache the answers of the server it named, affecting names outside the configured zone. Zone database lookups are now confined to names at or below the zone's origin. ISC would like to thank Henrique Pereira for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6361` - Fix crash on wildcard answers carrying both NSEC and NSEC3 proofs. :cve:`2026-80274` When a wildcard answer arrived with both NSEC and NSEC3 records at the name proving that the queried name did not exist, the resolver could pick different records when caching the answer and when retrieving the proof, depending on the order in which the authoritative server sent them. This could terminate :iscman:`named` with an assertion failure, fail the query with SERVFAIL, or serve a denial record other than the one that had been verified. The resolver now caches and serves the same denial record it accepted when the answer was received. ISC would like to thank hythyt for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6369` - Following HTTPS/SVCB aliases could leak resolver cache memory. :cve:`2026-81563` When a recursive server answered a query for an HTTPS or SVCB record in alias form and the alias target had more than 13 records, the target records were pinned in the cache permanently instead of being released once the answer was sent. A remote party who could make the server follow such aliases to a steady stream of fresh names could grow the cache beyond the configured :any:`max-cache-size` until the server was unable to resolve unrelated names. The records are now released correctly. ISC would like to thank Samy Medjahed/Ap4sh for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. :gl:`#6374` Feature Changes ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - Reject oversized and malformed DNSKEY records up front. Oversized RSA key material in a DNSKEY record was only rejected after it had been converted, allocating memory proportional to the record size. Such records are now rejected before conversion, as are Ed25519 and Ed448 keys with trailing bytes that were previously silently ignored. :gl:`#4537` Bug Fixes ~~~~~~~~~ - Prevent a crash when using both :any:`dns64` and ``filter-a``. An assertion failure was possible when using both :any:`dns64` and the ``filter-a`` plugin simultaneously; this has been fixed. :gl:`#5979` - Stop passing UDP client addresses to :any:`update-policy` ``external`` helpers. Dynamic update rules of type ``external`` delegate the authorization decision to an external helper daemon. The client address field in the helper request is only meant to carry TCP client addresses, which cannot easily be spoofed, but UDP client addresses were passed as well, so the helper could base its decision on an untrustworthy address. For updates arriving over UDP, the helper request no longer includes a client address. :gl:`#6061` - Missing required NSEC3 for delegation not detected. A missing required NSEC3 record for an insecure delegation in a non-opt-out range was not being detected. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6063` - Tighten EUI48 and EUI64 text parsing. Malformed EUI48 and EUI64 records could be accepted. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6082` - GeoIP ACL state could be stale or wrong after reload. Previously, :iscman:`named` cached GeoIP information after looking it up, but the cached information was not invalidated when the GeoIP database was reloaded, so it could continue to be used. Existing cached GeoIP information is now invalidated as part of the reloading process. :gl:`#6083` - Honor DNSSEC policy key tag ranges. When a :any:`dnssec-policy` configured a non-default ``tag-range``, :iscman:`dnssec-keygen` and :iscman:`dnssec-ksr` could accept generated keys outside that range. Both tools now honor the configured minimum and maximum key tags. :gl:`#6091` - Fix a double free in :iscman:`mdig` when EDNS options are specified. The :iscman:`mdig` utility could terminate with a double free when EDNS options were specified on the command line. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6095` - Fix a crash when an IXFR falls back to AXFR with updates still pending. When a secondary zone received an incremental transfer (IXFR) and the primary then caused :iscman:`named` to fall back to a full transfer (AXFR) while some of the already-received incremental changes were still waiting to be applied, :iscman:`named` could later crash when that transfer finished. The pending changes are now discarded correctly before the AXFR retry. :gl:`#6114` - Fix DS requests to parental agents over TLS. TLS configuration for parental agents was being ignored when sending DS requests. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6135` - Fix the :option:`rndc-confgen -q` (quiet) option. The command-line parsing in :iscman:`rndc-confgen` was broken, so :option:`rndc-confgen -q` did not work. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6187` - Enforce query ACLs for redirect zones and searched DLZs. Queries answered from redirect zones or searched DLZ databases did not consistently honor :any:`allow-query` and :any:`allow-query-on`, potentially exposing restricted DNS data to excluded clients or through excluded listening addresses. These ACLs are now enforced before redirect or DLZ data is returned. :gl:`#6251` :gl:`#6252` - Check ``asnum`` validity in GeoIP ACLs. The validity of autonomous system (AS) numbers is now checked at configuration time when parsing GeoIP ACLs that use ``asnum`` elements. ``asnum`` values start with an optional case-insensitive ``AS`` prefix, followed only by decimal digits, with no spaces or other extraneous characters. The value represented cannot exceed 2^32. :gl:`#6255` - Fix a crash on :any:`remote-servers` lists that reference themselves. Since 9.21.16 and 9.20.17, a :any:`remote-servers`, :any:`primaries`, ``masters``, or :any:`parental-agents` list that referenced itself, directly or through another list, made :iscman:`named` crash on startup or reconfiguration. Such references are again skipped and the remaining entries in the list are used, as in earlier versions. :gl:`#6287` - A record from outside a response policy zone could crash :iscman:`named`. A response policy zone transferred from a primary can contain a record whose name lies outside the zone. Such a record could terminate :iscman:`named` with an assertion failure, both when it arrived and again at every startup afterwards, because a secondary keeps it in its own copy of the zone. Records like this are now rejected and logged; previously one could also silently create a policy entry for an unrelated name. :gl:`#6304` - Invalid :any:`key-store` configuration could abort the DNSSEC tools. An invalid :any:`key-store` block named ``key-directory`` in a configuration file could abort the DNSSEC tools. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6313` - NSEC signature set could bypass the secure-delegation check. When proving that a delegation was insecure, the validator bounded an NSEC record's authority by the signer of whichever RRSIG happened to come first in the record's signature set, rather than the signature that actually verified. A grandparent NSEC padded with an extra, unverifiable signature could therefore pass the check that kept such proofs from reaching below a signed child zone. The validator now requires every signature on the NSEC to name the same signer and refuses proofs whose signature set is malformed or larger than :any:`max-validations-per-fetch` allows. :gl:`#6321` - Fix a possible :iscman:`nsupdate` issue when using GSS-TSIG. The :iscman:`nsupdate` process could terminate unexpectedly when using the GSS-TSIG mode executed with the :option:`nsupdate -g` option. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6325` - Fix a crash with a single-element ``geoip`` sortlist. If :iscman:`named` was configured with a single-element :any:`sortlist` containing a ``geoip`` ACL element, any matching query triggered an assertion failure. This has been fixed. :gl:`#6342` - Prevent out-of-bailiwick CNAMEs from evicting cached records. A recursive resolver could remove valid cached records when a DNS response contained an out-of-bailiwick CNAME with the same owner name. Out-of-bailiwick data is now discarded before it can modify the cache. :gl:`#6345` - Restore periodic cleanup of stale resolver address data. Stale resolver address data could remain cached until memory pressure or an explicit flush. The cleanup interval has been corrected, so stale entries are removed periodically again. :gl:`#6346` - Fix :iscman:`named-checkconf`/:iscman:`named` crash with malformed key name. When a primary/remote-server key name was malformed, :iscman:`named-checkconf` and :iscman:`named` were both crashing (after warning about the invalid key name). This is now fixed. :gl:`#6362` - Prevent resolver crashes while processing DNS over TCP. Recursive resolvers could terminate with an assertion failure while processing DNS responses over TCP under sustained traffic. The failure was observed on resolvers configured globally with ``forward only;``, but the same transport path is also used by iterative resolution. This has been fixed. :gl:`!12537` Notes for BIND 9.20.28 ---------------------- .. note:: The BIND 9.20.28 release was withdrawn after the discovery of a regression in it during pre-release testing. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.20 2024/07/23 13:50:32 taca Exp $ d3 3 a5 3 BLAKE2s (bind-9.20.29.tar.xz) = 56c60f788031e8d217d2d46c620dd7ba40fd0c7d376b39786e7f9e4b4958fe21 SHA512 (bind-9.20.29.tar.xz) = afedc73a1376d662eec86b7f0e5795a3b0302e7184af83f90d06e3b5054efb54f5d7ab73f777e0d1b84b25aa27f299de688c508e28f0a22e67ba5eb07aa46077 Size (bind-9.20.29.tar.xz) = 5966372 bytes @